Religious Accommodation After Groff

Briefing Undue Hardship in Scheduling Disputes After Groff

Start with the rule. Groff held that "‘undue hardship’ is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business" — "what an employer must show is that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business." The old shortcut is gone: "showing ‘more than a de minimis cost,’ as that phrase is used in common parlance, does not suffice to establish ‘undue hardship’ under Title VII. Hardison cannot be reduced to that one phrase." Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023). The statutory duty in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) runs to accommodation "without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business," and Groff adds two limits that decide scheduling fights: "Impacts on coworkers are relevant only to the extent those impacts go on to affect the conduct of the business," and "a hardship that is attributable to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion in general, or to the very notion of accommodating religious practice, cannot be considered ‘undue.’"

Next, pin down the evidentiary bar. In its fullest published treatment of Groff, Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue, 150 F.4th 1211 (9th Cir. 2025) explained that "an employer could not escape liability simply by showing that an accommodation would impose some sort of additional costs. Those costs would have to rise to the level of hardship, and adding the modifier ‘undue’ means that the requisite burden, privation, or adversity must rise to an ‘excessive’ or ‘unjustifiable’ level." Proof, not conjecture, carries that burden: "A claim of undue hardship cannot be supported by merely conceivable or hypothetical hardships; instead, it must be supported by proof of actual imposition on coworkers or disruption of the work routine." Risk can count — the court did not read "‘undue hardship’ to mean ‘realized hardships’" — but "[t]he risk of undue hardship, however, must be realistic and not ‘merely conceivable or hypothetical.’"

For scheduling accommodations specifically, De Souza v. The State of New York, No. 1:25-cv-01222 (S.D.N.Y. Mar 19, 2026) marks both sides of the line in a Sunday-Sabbath dispute. Quoting Groff’s instruction that "[c]onsideration of other options, such as voluntary shift swapping, would also be necessary," the court recognized that "employer approval of voluntary shift swaps can constitute a reasonable accommodation, even if a plaintiff does not show that such a scheme will definitively eliminate the conflict between an employment requirement and their religious practice." One pre-Groff rule survives intact, though: it is still an undue hardship "for an employer to take steps to accommodate an employee that would violate its obligations under the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement" — Groff raised the cost showing without unsettling bona fide seniority systems.

The brief section then writes itself in three moves. State the rule: undue hardship means substantial increased costs in the conduct of this employer’s particular business, judged on the facts known when the accommodation was denied. Hold the employer to Petersen’s line — staffing data, overtime figures, concrete operational impact — because conceivable or hypothetical burdens cannot support summary judgment. Then walk through the options the employer never explored: voluntary swaps, schedule adjustments, temporary coverage. Under Groff, an employer "must do more than conclude that forcing other employees to work overtime would constitute an undue hardship. Consideration of other options would also be necessary" — evaluating only the requested accommodation and stopping is itself the violation.