Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
Section 1 conspiracy claims must plead plausible agreement — parallel conduct alone is not enough.
Practice Area Spotlight
Antitrust litigators use Midpage to research Sherman and Clayton Act claims, merger challenges, Robinson-Patman disputes, and FTC enforcement actions. The statutes, regulations, and case law behind that work are collected below.
Browse to see how Midpage works through antitrust questions from real lawyers.
The statutes, regulations, agency materials, and courts behind antitrust litigation.
The federal acts governing competition — restraints of trade, monopolization, mergers, price discrimination, and FTC enforcement — section by section.
| § 1 — Restraints of trade Contracts, combinations, and conspiracies | 15 U.S.C. § 1 |
| § 2 — Monopolization Monopoly power and exclusionary conduct | 15 U.S.C. § 2 |
| § 3 — Territories & D.C. Restraints in territories and the District | 15 U.S.C. § 3 |
| § 6a — FTAIA Foreign trade antitrust improvements | 15 U.S.C. § 6a |
The CFR parts implementing FTC competition procedures, Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger review, and the FTC guides.
| Part 2 — Investigations CIDs, subpoenas, and nonadjudicative process | 16 CFR Part 2 |
| Part 3 — Adjudicative proceedings Administrative litigation rules | 16 CFR Part 3 |
DOJ Antitrust Division enforcement policies, the joint DOJ–FTC Merger Guidelines, and FTC guidance and Part 3 adjudications.
| DOJ Antitrust Division GuidanceComing soon Business review letters, leniency policy, and model leniency letters | Guidance |
| DOJ & FTC Merger GuidelinesComing soon Horizontal and vertical merger analysis frameworks | Guidance |
| FTC GuidanceComing soon § 5 unfair-methods policy statements, advisory opinions, and competition advocacy | Guidance |
| FTC Administrative DecisionsComing soon Part 3 merger and competition adjudications | Decisions |
| Federal Register DOJ and FTC antitrust, HSR, and advertising rulemakings (1994–present) | Rules & Notices |
The appellate, trial, and administrative forums where antitrust disputes are heard — from the Supreme Court to FTC Part 3 adjudication.
| Appellate U.S. Supreme Court; all 13 federal circuits; D.C. Circuit (merger and agency review); state supreme and appellate courts |
| Trial U.S. District Courts — including D.D.C., N.D. Cal., S.D.N.Y., N.D. Ill., and E.D. Va., plus remaining federal district courts nationwide |
| Administrative Federal Trade Commission (Part 3 adjudication); DOJ Antitrust Division enforcement actions |
The controlling authorities — linked to full text, treatment, and citing decisions in Midpage.
Section 1 conspiracy claims must plead plausible agreement — parallel conduct alone is not enough.
The two-element test for § 2: monopoly power plus its willful acquisition or maintenance.
The foundational § 7 framework for defining product and geographic markets in merger cases.
The remoteness factors that govern antitrust standing under Clayton Act § 4.
Two-sided transaction platforms require defining the market to include both sides.
NCAA compensation limits get full rule-of-reason review — no antitrust immunity for amateurism.
No antitrust duty to deal with rivals absent the narrow Aspen Skiing exception; harm must be to competition, not competitors.
Applied the three-step rule of reason to app-store restraints and upheld the anti-steering injunction.
Vertical-merger challenge to Illumina/GRAIL — endorsed the FTC’s § 7 analysis while remanding on the rebuttal standard.
Hub-and-spoke § 1 claims survived where lessors pooled non-public data in a shared pricing algorithm.
Affirmed that the American–JetBlue Northeast Alliance violated § 1 under the rule of reason.
Exclusive search-distribution agreements unlawfully maintained a monopoly under § 2.
Shared pricing software without pooling of confidential competitor data is not concerted action.
Secondary-line injury requires price discrimination between purchasers competing for the same customers.
Competitive injury may be inferred from a substantial, sustained price gap between competing buyers.
Reverse-payment patent settlements are subject to rule-of-reason antitrust scrutiny.